Search results for "Practical reason"
showing 10 items of 17 documents
A BDI agent system for credit risk assessment based on fuzzy logic
2007
Credit risk has always been an important issue for banks and other financial intermediaries. A reliable and consistent computing system is necessary to simplify the decision making process in uncertain domains such as the assessment of credit risk. In recent years fuzzy logic techniques have been in their wide-ranging use in modeling of uncertainties, vagueness, impreciseness and the human thought process. Therefore in this paper we present a fuzzy logic based intelligent system for the assessment of credit risk. It aims at efficiently and intelligently managing the process, handling its complexity, and monitoring large amounts of dynamic information in a distributed way, by using a society…
Dificultades y límites en la ampliación de la comunidad moral
2009
These pages aim to answer the question, from the ethical theory, of whether it is necessary to extend the universe of moral beings in order to account for the responsibility we have for other beings and for nature in general. To this end, we review the various proposals calling for an extension to the moral community. Following the critical dialogue with these traditions, we argue that the moral community does not need to be extended, but that the concept of moral responsibility requires reconstruction
La noción de prejuicio en la obra de Immanuel Kan
2014
The notion of prejudice occupies a not very visible place in the Kantian works. In fact it has been seldom treated in Kantian studies in German, English, French, Italian or Spanish. But it connects with relevant key notes of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) as well as from the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Critique of Judgement (1790). The aim of this paper consists in the analysis of the Kantian notion of prejudice, its systematic place and its sources (among these particularly the works of Georg Friedrich Meier and the thought of Christian Thomasius).
¿Naturalizar la idea de justicia? Una respuesta crítica desde la teoría moral de Jürgen Habermas
2017
The aim of this paper is to study critically, with the help of Habermas´s moral theory, the current naturalistic approach to morality —which is based on both the evolutionary theory and neuroscience—. In doing so it will be explained the specifically moral use of practical reason, as Habermas propose; it will be compared this moral use with Kohlberg's postconventional stage of moral development; and it will be claimed that naturalistic approach cannot explain this stage, that can be understood as specific justice area.
The Role of Ciphering in Phenomenology of Life
2004
Contemporary philosophy is inseparable from the general tendencies of spiritual life that have dominated over the past centuries. The ruling tendency of European-type philosophy has been the affirmation of a democratic life style, liberal values and human individuality and creative activity. The testimony to this is the proportional growth of the philosophy of subjectivism since modern times, the division of pure practical reason and reasoning into separate spheres to substantiate fundamental human abilities, to analyse the ways of grasping the world — such as cognition, understanding, intuition, deciphering, experience — and describe man’s correlation with beingness (cosmos). Epistemology …
?What ought we do?? and other questions
2020
Kant formulates the question “What ought I do?” as an agent’s question. This is not the only way in which practical reasoning can be approached. A great deal of contemporary work in ethics and political philosophy addresses different, often narrower, questions. Much of it focuses primarily on recipients rather than agents, and so on entitlements or rights rather than on requirements or duties to act, including most obviously discussions of human rights. I will consider some of the consequences and the advantages of starting from each of these questions, and some of the ways in which each shapes practical reasoning.
The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism
2019
This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant’s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected.
Hans Kelsen and Practical Reason
2017
The critique of practical reason, in all its possible forms, has a far more important and decisive role in Kelsen’s thought than the rejection of Natural law doctrine. Admitting that a practical use of reason is legitimate, namely, that there is a possible connection between intellect and will, would mean destroying the whole foundation of the scientific undertaking of the Pure Theory of law and its conception of the legal norm, which is its central aspect. By depriving practical reason of all foundation, any reference to agency and practical deliberation is excluded from Kelsen’s theory of law. Consequently, the Ought loses all capacity of attraction and motivation of human action, renderi…
Is the Categorical Imperative the Highest Principle of Both Pure Practical and Theoretical Reason?
2014
AbstractIn her new book, Patricia Kitcher supports Onora O'Neill's view that the categorical imperative is the highest principle of both practical and theoretical reason. I claim that neither O'Neill's original interpretation nor Kitcher's additional evidence in favour of it are convincing. At its core, this misconception of Kant's position consists in the identification of self-referential critique of reason with the concept of autonomy. It will be shown that the ‘common principle’ (Kant) of both practical and theoretical reason is not the categorical imperative, but the reflective power of judgement, as Kant claims in the Critique of the Power of Judgement.
Choice and Practical Reasoning in Ancient Philosophy
2013
Ancient thinkers acknowledged that we are the sort of creatures that want things to be a certain way and can make efforts for them to become that way. In that sense, the ancients had a notion of volition. But it is not clear how they conceived of volition. The problem is partly historical. Some late ancient, notably Christian thinkers came to regard volition in a different way than earlier thinkers had done, seeing reason as a less powerful ability than Socrates did, and instead placing their hopes on the will, which they regarded as a separate and sovereign part of the soul. About these historical developments there is much debate and little agreement. The problem is also partly conceptual…